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Kuhn on Essentialism and the Causal
Theory of Reference*
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen†‡
The causal theory of reference is often taken to provide a solution to the problems,
such as incomparability and referential discontinuity, that the meaning-change thesis
raised. I show that Kuhn successfully questioned the causal theory and Putnam’s idea
that reference is determined via the sameness relation of essences that holds between
a sample and other members of a kind in all possible worlds. Putnam’s single ‘essential’
properties may be necessary but not sufficient to determine membership in a kind
category. Kuhn argued that extension is fixed by similarity-dissimilarity relations that
are liable to change in taxonomic reorganizations of science.
1. Introduction. There has been an upsurge of interest in Kuhn in recent
years. Kuhn is no longer necessarily taken as an irrationalist and a radical
philosopher in the same mode as the later Feyerabend. As a consequence,
the old view of Kuhn has been replaced by a whole diversity of views
(e.g., Hoyningen-Huene 1993; Bird 2000; Fuller 2000; Andersen 2001a;
Sharrock and Read 2002). And yet, few interpretations have tried to assess
Kuhn’s significance for the debates on the causal theory of reference and
essentialism.1
This neglect is surprising for two reasons. First, Kuhn took the chal-
lenge of the causal theory seriously and attempted to formulate his re-
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1. The exception is Sharrock and Read (2002) and also Read and Sharrock (2002).
KUHN, ESSENTIALISM AND CAUSAL THEORY 545
sponse to it directly and indirectly on various occasions.2 Second, the
causal theory of reference plays a central role in the debates on the ra-
tionality and progress of science. Often, it has been taken to provide a
solution to the problems of meaning change, such as incomparability and
referential discontinuity, that the writings of Kuhn and other historical
philosophers raised.3
Kuhn thought that the causal theory was “a breakthrough with respect
to proper names,” but he rejected it as a general theory of reference
applicable in science (2000, 312). However, Kuhn is generally not taken
to have succeeded in producing something that deserves serious philo-
sophical attention, especially with regard to more technical aspects, such
as rigidity and essentialism. Suppe already stated bluntly that “despite his
sustained efforts to reply to critics and clarify, modify, or improve his
position . . . increasing numbers of philosophers of science reject Kuhn’s
approach as irredeemably flawed, although not as hopeless as Feyera-
bend’s” (1977, 647–48). Although this comment applies to Kuhn’s early
papers, the response to Kuhn’s attempts to specify his philosophical po-
sition did not change over the years. For example, Bird writes that it is
very hard to see the relevance of Kuhn’s critique of Putnam, although
the causal theory and essentialism have been under close scrutiny by
analytic philosophers. Bird thinks that Kuhn had a “tin ear” for analytic
philosophical arguments (2004b, 74–75). In actuality, before Sharrock and
Read, who think that Kuhn gave strong reasons to doubt whether the
causal theory is “co-tenable with a decent understanding of the history
and philosophy of science” (2002, 152), on the one hand, and Andersen,
Barker, and Chen (Andersen, Barker, and Chen 1996; Chen, Andersen,
and Barker 1998; Barker, Chen, and Andersen 2003) on the other, it is
hard to find any positive references in the philosophy of science literature
to Kuhn’s theory of reference and concept formation, and moreover, it
is practically impossible to find any at all in the philosophy of language
literature still today.
I argue that Kuhn’s criticism of the causal theory contains elements
worth serious consideration. Kuhn can be seen to contribute to many
central topics in contemporary analytic philosophy, specifically, discussion
2. His view is presented directly in “Possible Worlds in History of Science” (reprinted
in Kuhn 2000). Note that “Dubbing and Redubbing: The Vulnerability of Rigid Des-
ignation” (Kuhn 1990) is a reduced and revised version of an early draft of “Possible
Worlds.” Also “Metaphor in Science” (reprinted in 2000) is relevant. Indirectly, he
developed his theory of concepts over many years (see n. 6 for literature).
3. The first who suggested that reference might offer such a solution is Scheffler (1967).
Sankey’s (1994, 1997, 2000) and Bird’s (2000, 2002, 2004b) writings offer an excellent
source on the role of the causal theory in the discussion.
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on rigid reference and essentialism, with direct relevance for philosophy
of science. First, he offers a principled way to question whether natural
kinds can be fixed by their essences. Further, he develops a unique nat-
uralistic theory of reference fixing by similarity and dissimilarity sets.
Finally, Kuhn calls into question the arguments for progress that rely on
the Putnam-Kripke causal theory, or on some close modification of it,
and that understand scientific development as consisting of improving
approximations of the real joints of nature
The causal theory was designed to fix a reference of a kind term without
any description. Reference is determined directly by the hidden essence
shared between the instances of the kind. As a consequence, theories are
comparable via common references, and reference is not sensitive to theory
changes. Further, the stability of reference provides continuity against
which the progress of science can be measured, which can be understood
as a gradual improvement in our understanding of the fundamental struc-
ture of the world, constituted by natural kinds to which our scientific
terms refer. However, in the later Kuhn’s view, scientific revolutions, un-
derstood as reorganizations of scientific taxonomies, are central phenom-
ena in the history of science. More precisely, Kuhn’s questioning of the
causal theory, essentialism, and rigid reference leads to a view that the
references of natural kind terms may change in (taxonomic) scientific
revolutions, casting doubt on whether the history of science can be viewed
as a gradual improvement and specification of the essences of the pre-
structured set of natural kinds. According to Kuhn’s theory, references
of kind terms are determined through a network of similarity and dissim-
ilarity relations, which specify what properties an entity can and cannot
have in order to qualify as that kind. Similarity-dissimilarity sets do not
entail any principled distinction between essential and superficial prop-
erties. Although the original formation of sets does not require any de-
scription, the descriptive content stored in the sets is subsequently needed
to keep the boundaries between kind categories sharp.
In this article, I first examine recent interpretations of Kuhn, seeking
to pinpoint their strengths and inadequacies. An interesting point in
Kuhn’s argumentation against the causal theory is that his theorizing is
inclined toward naturalism. Second, it is notable that a number of theories
in cognitive science show similarity to Kuhn’s ideas on the emergence and
nature of kind categories. For this reason, I flesh out in what sense Kuhn
can be seen as a naturalist. Third, I study in detail Kuhn’s reasons for
opposing the causal theory of reference, attempting to show that there
are many points in his writings that are relevant and interesting with
respect to many central topics in both philosophy of science and analytic
philosophy.
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2. Four Images of Kuhn. Hoyningen-Huene’s image of Kuhn as a Kantian
is the oldest and arguably most influential of the new interpretations,
emerging after the rationality debate of the 1960s and 1970s. He argued
that Kuhn implicitly distinguished two different kinds of worlds: the world
in itself and the phenomenal world. The former is unknowable and purely
“object sided,” while the latter is constituted by the object-sided world in
itself and by subject-sided moments originating with an epistemic subject
(Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 31–42; see also Devitt 1997, 72, 156–57). In
addition, several monographs since 2000 and numerous articles on Kuhn
over the last 20 years have appeared, many of which attempt to reassess
Kuhn’s position in philosophy somehow. A further three images of Kuhn
emerge from this literature.4
First, there is Kuhn the empiricist. This view maintains that Kuhn’s
philosophy, in contrast to early interpretations, either has clear parallels
with logical empiricism or may even be regarded as having inherited
directly a number of central tenets from that tradition. One or both of
these arguments can be found in Bird’s book (2000) and in some of his
many papers on Kuhn (2002, 2004a) but also in an older paper by English
(1978) and in articles by Reisch (1991), Earman (1993), Irzik and Gru¨n-
berg (1995), and Friedman (2003). The most recent suggestion along these
lines is Gattei (2008), who takes Kuhn’s philosophy as an anti-Popperian
extension of logical empiricism. The connection between Kuhn and logical
empiricism can be established in various ways. An interesting description
is given by Bird. According to it, Kuhn retained many of the central
doctrines of logical positivism, such as intensionalism (i.e., the idea that
intension determines reference), meaning holism, and skepticism toward
theoretical entities. In addition, he writes that partially because of these
commitments, Kuhn ignored many of the central developments in con-
temporary analytic philosophy: externalism in epistemology and seman-
tics including the causal theory.
Second, there is Kuhn the precursor of cognitive science. That is the
view brought forward notably in the papers by Andersen, Barker, and
Chen (Andersen et al. 1996; Chen et al. 1998; Barker et al. 2003) and
also by Bird (2000, 2004c, 2005) in a slightly different sense. The former
focus on Kuhn’s adoption of the family resemblance theory of concepts
and concept learning as well as its application to philosophy of science.
This theory, which questions the classical theory of concepts that defines
a concept by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, is alleged to be
corroborated by empirical research in cognitive psychology.
Finally, we find also Kuhn the Wittgensteinian therapeutic philosopher.
4. Steve Fuller (2000) is ignored here because his portrayal of Kuhn as a conservative
in the political sense is not relevant in the current context.
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That is the thesis advanced by Sharrock and Read (2002; see also Read
and Sharrock 2002). They argue that Kuhn did not wish to develop any
positive theory of science, but his misunderstood message was that phi-
losophy of science has to leave everything (to science) as it is. As part of
this argument, they also sought to revive Kuhn’s case against the Putnam-
Kripke causal theory of reference.
Bird’s (2004c, 2005) aim of interpreting Kuhn in the naturalistic frame-
work is plausible. There are indeed elements in Kuhn that justify viewing
him as a naturalist. However, I do not think that Kuhn’s refusal to ad-
vocate the causal theory of reference is regrettable and a consequence of
his embracing the non-naturalistic empiricist legacy. With regard to this,
Read and Sharrock (2002; cf. Bird 2004b) raise an important point. They
note that a “‘taxonomic conception’ of natural kinds,” or “systematicity”
(Sharrock and Read 2002, 151, 155), provides an explanation of and a
reason for Kuhn’s opposition. However, they also object to portraying
Kuhn as a naturalist, which is unfortunate because linking systematicity
with his naturalism gives us a better understanding of Kuhn’s rejection
of the causal theory. In order to see this, we need to employ the ideas of
Andersen et al. on how similarity and dissimilarity relations determine
concepts.5 Their suggestion can be used to make Kuhn’s theory of ex-
tension determination explicit. Having said this, it is important to notice
that Andersen’s (2001b) attempt to characterize Kuhn’s position as an
intermediate position between realism and constructivism takes her close
to the Kantian image of Kuhn.
3. Kuhn’s Naturalism. Kuhn’s philosophy can be linked to naturalism via
his theory of concepts. An important influence here is Wittgenstein and
his notion of family resemblance, which can already be seen in Kuhn
(1970). Kuhn writes that the use of terms, as ‘chair’, ‘leaf’, and ‘game’,
does not require grasping some set of attributes that these and only these
posses: “Natural families [are ] . . . constituted by a network of over-
lapping and crisscross resemblances” (45). In the 1970s, Kuhn returns to
discuss characterization of concepts and the notion of family resemblance
on several occasions.6 Kuhn asks how a child who has not had any pre-
vious experience in recognizing and naming objects, or a student who
5. If I talk generally on their account, I will use Andersen et al. The presentation of
their view is based on their three collective articles: Andersen et al. (1996), Chen et al.
(1998), and Barker et al. (2003).
6. Kuhn deals with the notion of family resemblance mainly in the following papers
originally published in the 1970s: “Postscript” (in 2000), “Logic of Discovery or Psy-
chology of Research” (in 1977), “Reflections on My Critics” (in 2000), “Second
Thoughts on Paradigms” (in 2000), and “Discussion on Second Thoughts on Para-
digms” (in 1977).
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becomes a new member of a specialist scientific community, can come to
master the concepts of the group. This process of learning involves a
person who has already mastered the usage of the prevailing concepts and
understands the differences between the instances of different concepts,
who points to objects telling the learner under what category each of them
falls. A learner may make mistakes and is corrected by the teacher until
she or he learns to use the new concepts correctly. The process of concept
learning results in the construction of family resemblance concepts, in-
stances of which are bound by similarities to the instances of the same
concept and by dissimilarities to the instances of other concepts. A natural
family “is a class whose members resemble each other more closely than
they resemble the members of other natural families” (Kuhn 1977, 285).
Kuhn assumes that ostensive learning does not require any previous
understanding of the criteria of categorization and that people are able
to attain the relevant category-fixing criteria directly from the world with-
out conscious mediation by the mind. Learned similarity-dissimilarity re-
lationships “are prior . . . to a list of criteria which . . . would enable
us to define our terms. . . . They are parts of a language-conditioned or
language-correlated way of seeing the world. Until we have acquired them,
we do not see a world at all” (2000, 171). This implies that the process
is automatic and takes place prelinguistically. Kuhn does indeed refer to
“neural processing,” which can be programmed differently and which
preconditions the practice of object clustering (2000, 197 n. 14). The sim-
ilarity sets produced in concept learning count as knowledge acquired of
the world, which is subsequently stored in the mind. Later, he begins to
talk of conceptual schemes, lexical taxonomies, and lexicons or mental
modules that all appear to have the same function: they taxonomically
store empirical information that is acquired of the world.7
Kuhn’s interest in information acquisition and its organization in the
mind is remarkable because it is something that already for decades has
been an object of research in cognitive science and psychology and, spe-
cifically, in a field that has become known as “knowledge representation.”
A classic theory is Collins and Quillian’s (1969) suggestion that infor-
mation is stored in a hierarchically organized semantic network composed
of nodes representing concepts and attribute descriptions associated with
each concept. This model has faced difficulties since, but the assumption
that information organization, or knowledge representation, is best de-
scribed in terms of multiple interconnected assumptions and relations
7. Kuhn (1957) already says that the “conceptual scheme” is a framework for the
organization of knowledge, guiding future research, and helping to recall data (37–
41).
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appears to be widely accepted and is a result of continuous empirical
testing and modeling.8
The most serious problem with the semantic network theory is that it
does not take into account that some instances of concept are, in fact,
taken to be more typical than others. Eleanor Rosch showed, for example,
how the Dani tribe took even a particular color as the best example of
the color concept. Since then, there have been numerous studies with tools,
clothing, furniture, animals, trees, fish, and birds that all come to the same
conclusion: some members of a category are considered better, more typ-
ical examples than others. Human concepts show thus graded structures,
varying on the perceived goodness of example (Andersen et al. 1996, 352).9
The lesson appeared to be twofold. First, it was necessary to reconsider
how information stored in the mind can be represented. The semantic
network model does not allow variation. Being a member of a category
is an all-or-nothing affair: an instance either fulfills membership criteria
or not. Second, if an instance of a concept cannot be characterized by
the same set of attributes, we need to consider, in light of these empirical
results, how a concept could be characterized. Interestingly, Rosch ex-
plicitly called into question the classic account of concept definition by a
set of necessary and sufficient conditions and proposed Wittgenstein’s
theory of concepts as an alternative to it. She reasons that, because all
members of a category just do not share any set of exactly the same
features, the features determining membership are better described as a
large set over which individual instances overlap but do not share com-
pletely, that is, as a family resemblance concept. That is also Kuhn’s view,
as was already shown above.
With regard to knowledge representation, one of the most successful
ideas for improvement was Marvin Minsky’s (1980) suggestion that in-
formation is stored in frames that have an internal structure, which con-
tains a cluster of “knowledge” associated with a concept. A frame can
be characterized as a collection of slots and slot fillers that describe a
stereotypical item. Alternatively, we may say that a frame is composed
of attributes and their values. It may incorporate a taxonomic structure
because of the fact that superkind and subkind can be taken as attributes,
and values can be taken as attributes of further values. For example, in
8. On Collins and Quillian’s semantic network and a philosophical introduction to
knowledge representation, see Stevenson (1993, esp. chap. 2). An examination of the
similarities between their illustration of the memory structure of a conceptual hierarchy
and Kuhn’s description of it would constitute a fruitful subject for a more detailed
study not attempted here.
9. See Andersen et al. (1996) on references to Rosch. See also Lakoff (1987, 41–42)
on various experiments that were used to test and substantiate prototype effects.
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the frame of dog, an attribute subkind can have different breeds of dogs
as values that then may be subdivided further. The stipulation that a
frame describes a stereotypical item means that a description does not
function as a definition as in the classical account of concepts; that is, a
description is not necessarily true of all instances that are in the extension
of a concept. All that can be said is that typically such objects have the
features postulated in the frame, and a frame thus induces expectations
of what kinds of things objects are.10
At this point, it is worth noting what Kuhn said of lexical structures:
“Imagine, for a moment, that for each individual a referring term is a
node in a lexical network from which radiate labels for the criteria that
he or she uses in identifying the referents of the nodal term. Those criteria
will tie some terms together and distance them from others, thus building
a multidimensional structure within the lexicon” (2000, 52). The descrip-
tion sounds very much like those of the semantic network or the frame
model, if we remember that they represent information by the attribute-
value structure and understand their taxonomy-building feature.
Andersen, Barker, and Chen have formulated a theory that incorporates
what Kuhn says about learning and determining concepts with the frame
model as further developed by Lawrence Barsalou (1992). Furthermore,
they invoke Rosch’s studies, and their fundamental conclusion is that the
frame model supports the existence of graded structures. Because of its
flexibility, the frame model can accommodate variable representations of
instances in one and the same frame. Andersen et al. argue that Kuhn’s
theory of concepts is “massively supported by empirical work in cognitive
psychology” (1996, 359). Yet, Barker et al.’s most intriguing claim is that
cognitive psychology has provided an “empirical vindication of the family
resemblance account” and that empirical findings have shown that “nec-
essary-and-sufficient condition definition of concepts will be impossible”
(Barker et al. 2003, 218, 219).
We should ask whether it is correct to claim that definition by necessary
and sufficient conditions “will be impossible.” I think this claim is too
strong. It is undeniable that there is a lot of empirical evidence for the
view according to which “human concepts,” such as concepts of trees,
birds, and furniture, cannot be defined by a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions. Andersen et al. are able to cite a long, but undoubtedly not
exhaustive, list of studies that advance this point (e.g., Andersen et al.
1996, 352). However, the past failure of the classical account does not
mean that it will also fail in the future. The lack of progress of attempts
to find the defining features of a concept thus far does not yet mean that
10. See Thagard (1984) on the utility and status of frames in philosophy.
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there are no defining features—only that we have not yet been able to
find them (cf. Smith and Medin 1981, 30–31). Indeed, Kuhn remarked
that some concepts seem to possess a definitional core and appear in and
are defined by exceptionless laws of nature, such as ‘force’ defined by
Newton’s laws of motion (1993, 316–17). Kuhn argues that these ‘nomic’
concepts cannot be learned by contrast to other related concepts, but in
complex problem situations, because there are no objects that could be
pointed at by ostension.11
What then is Kuhn’s naturalism? The process that produces the simi-
larity and dissimilarity sets can be compared to gathering empirical knowl-
edge from one’s surroundings and results in concepts that are qualitatively
similar to such knowledge. Kuhn’s theory of concept acquisition and
reference fixing are thus naturalistic in the sense that they do not imply
existence of non-natural concepts and need for a nonscientific method.
Although Kuhn did not have an explicit aspiration to be a naturalist, his
philosophy fits well the naturalistic idea of philosophy and science.12 And
significantly, Kuhn’s theory of concept learning receives empirical support
both with regard to how the end result, that is, the information acquired,
is stored and represented in the mind and how the concepts that emerge
as a result of this process are understood. In brief, it is empirically grounded.
4. Reference of Natural Kind Terms. Kuhn formulated his critique of the
causal theory of reference as represented by Putnam explicitly in two
articles (1990; 2000, 58–90).13 The first thing to notice is that Kuhn was
not totally dismissive of the causal theory, but he endorsed it within a
limited range of application. Kuhn says that by denying the descriptive
determination of reference of proper names, the causal theory has brought
“a great advantage” (1990, 309; 2000, 198, 312–13). The problems arise
if the same theory is extended also to natural kind terms: “When one
11. Andersen and Nersessian (2000) have attempted to take this approach further and
argued that family resemblance nevertheless can be taken to play a major role in both
learning and representation of nomic concepts.
12. In addition to Kuhn theorizing on concepts and reference, his early view on the
history of science was based on empirical historical research (cf. Bird 2000; Sharrock
and Read 2002; Kuukkanen 2009). However, in one of his last papers, Kuhn surpris-
ingly expressed his desire to use a priori or pure philosophical reasoning to reach the
same conclusions (2000, 95, 112, 115). He was referring to what might be called naive
empiricism in history, which he and others had used to refute the foundationalist image
of science that derived from logical empiricism. The later Kuhn saw that history does
not necessarily yield such an unequivocal judgment.
13. In addition to Putnam (1975), Kripke (1980) is naturally another classic in the
development of the causal theory of reference. However, Kuhn’s focus was on Putnam’s
theory, and because our focus is on Kuhn, we will not examine here Kripke’s thinking.
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makes the transition from proper names to the names of natural kinds,
one loses access to the career line or lifeline which, in the case of proper
names, enables one to check the correctness of different applications of
the same term. The individuals which constitute natural families do have
lifelines, but the natural family itself does not” (2000, 199).
Kuhn gives us an example of a case in which the causal theory works
and of another in which it does not. A single act of ostension is enough
to fix reference to ‘Richard Boyd’. The situation is entirely different when
one is presented the deflected needle of a galvanometer and simultaneously
told that the cause of the deflection was ‘electric charge’. Kuhn claims
that with natural kinds “a number of acts of ostension are required.”
Further, in regard of natural kind terms (e.g., ‘swan’, ‘goose’, ‘electric
charge’, etc.), an establishment of reference requires exposure not only to
“varied members of that kind but also to members of others—to indi-
viduals, that is, to which the term might otherwise have been mistakenly
applied” (2000, 200).
What does Kuhn’s critique boil down to? At first sight, it may look as
if it is similar to the so-called Qua problem, that is, the problem that
reference cannot be picked out without a descriptive specification of the
kind of object that is being referred to because the number of the kinds
of objects that may be picked out is practically unlimited (e.g., Sterelny
1983, 121; Devitt and Sterelny 1999, 79–81, 90–93). But this is not the
crux of the argument, as Kuhn is clearly not disputing the ostensive
determination of reference. What he wants to point out is that a single
act of ostension is not enough in such cases; reference fixing requires
multiple acts of ostension, not only to members of the kind whose ref-
erence is being fixed but also to members of other kinds. As we saw in
the previous section, Kuhn believed that direct contact with objects and
ostensive learning results in mental categories that classify objects ac-
cording to their similarities and dissimilarities, that is, in accordance with
his neural-processing model.
In general, the problems with ostensive reference fixing are well known,
and most discussants have suggested that some kind of descriptive com-
ponent is required (e.g., Devitt and Sterelny 1999, 96–101; Stanford and
Kitcher 2000). Kuhn stands out because his idea of reference baptizing
arises out of his naturalistic theories of concept learning. He criticizes the
ostensive determination of reference, without suggesting that we need a
descriptive theory of reference fixing. His theory could be said to be a
kind of naturalistic model, wherein the direct and preconscious adaptation
of the mind to a large number of external outputs leads to success in
recognizing and categorizing objects and produces sets of similarity and
dissimilarity relations or categories in the mind of a person.
The quotation above suggests that Kuhn is concerned not only with
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baptizing but also with the question of what the reference of general terms
could be. As he pointed out, there is no problem with proper names, as
there is normally some individual to which a name refers, but in the case
of general terms, there is no such individual. Kuhn writes that “the tech-
niques of dubbing” and “of tracing lifelines” allow us to track astronomical
individuals, such as the Earth, Moon, Mars, and Venus, through episodes
of theory change. There is no change in the “lifelines” of individuals in
transition from the heliocentric to the geocentric theory. ‘Mars’, for ex-
ample, still refers to the same individual, that is, Mars. But there was a
change in natural families because, for instance, ‘the moon’ and ‘the sun’
did belong to the family of ‘the planets’, but ‘the Earth’ did not, and so
on (Kuhn 2000, 205). He makes his case forcefully in his last interview:
“Look, you can trace the individual planets, Mars, heavenly bodies
through the Copernican revolution—what you can’t trace through it is
‘planets.’ Planets are just a different collection before and afterward. There
was a sort of localized break that fitted very closely. And now it turns
out that some people, to an extent that surprises me and others, simply
say, ‘In the Ptolemaic systems planets go around the Earth and in the
Copernican system they go around the sun.’ But that’s an incoherent
statement! . . . I do not think it [the causal theory] works for common
nouns” (2000, 312–13).
There are two things to point out from the passage above. First, Kuhn
argues that if we cannot fix reference to an individual, we seem to lose
referential stability. Second, and more important, Kuhn implicitly suggests
what the reference of general terms is. It is the extension of a term, that
is, the set or class of individuals that are in the extension. This was already
suggested above by his ideas of how concepts are learned or how extension
of kind terms is fixed (see also 2000, 82, 84 n. 30, 85). This reading makes
Kuhn’s exclamation above intelligible. ‘Planet’ refers to different sets of
individuals in the Ptolemaic system and in the Copernican system; that
is, there was a change in the extension of ‘planet’ in the transition to the
Copernican system. From this perspective, Kuhn is absolutely right to
insist that to say without any qualification, “In the Ptolemaic systems
planets go around the Earth and in the Copernican system they go around
the sun,” is absurd. For example, with the Ptolemaic reading of ‘planet’,
it includes the individual called ‘sun’. Then the claim implies that it goes
around another individual called ‘Earth’. But how could one then also
claim that ‘planets’ also traverse around the sun, specifically because that
individual is taken to be in the extension of ‘planet’, without recognizing
the change in the extension (cf. Kuhn 2000, 94)?
Kuhn’s understanding of meaning change as change in extension, even
after becoming familiar with the causal theory, seems justified if general
terms refer to individuals or classes of them. In any case, if the reference
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is not an individual or sets and classes of them, it is not at least immediately
clear what it is. For Kuhn, this commitment became increasingly impor-
tant in his middle and later career, as change in extension came to be
central phenomena in scientific revolutions: “That sort of redistribution
of individuals among natural families or kinds, . . . is, I now feel, a central
(perhaps the central) feature of the episodes I have previously labelled
scientific revolutions” (2000, 205).14
Having said this, it is clear that to take general terms to designate their
extensions is by no means the only possibility. Further, while it is rec-
ognized that there is no obvious candidate for the reference of common
nouns, it also is understood what the consequence of the commitment to
extension is: terms would refer nonrigidly (e.g., Laporte 2000, 294; 2007;
Schwartz 2002; Devitt 2005, 140; Haukioja 2006, 156). If ‘tiger’ refers to
all the tigers in this world, it does not follow that it refers to the same
set in all possible worlds. Quite clearly, some tigers might not have existed,
and some others could have come into existence. A further consequence
is that we would seem to lose the prospect of finding interesting, necessary,
a posteriori truths by way of theoretical identifications, such as ‘Waterp
H2O’. That is because both designators in an identity statement have to
refer rigidly in order to express a necessary truth (e.g., Laporte 2007; cf.
Soames 2002, chap. 10).
A popular response is to say that natural kind terms refer to some kind
of abstract or universal objects (Donellan 1983; Laporte 2000). ‘Tiger’
would refer to the abstract kind tiger in all possible worlds and ‘water’
similarly to the abstract kind water in all possible worlds. The problem
with this suggestion is that it threatens to trivialize rigidity because we
could construct kinds as we wish. ‘Bachelor’ would refer to the kind
bachelor, and so on. As a consequence, rigidity could not be used to
distinguish between natural and non-natural kind terms. For some, this
is enough to make kind rigidity unacceptable (Schwartz 2002; Soames
2002, 249–50, 260–61; Devitt 2005), while some continue to pursue this
line of argument (Laporte 2000). It also is worth noting that the proposal
that explains rigidity by taking general terms to designate abstract kinds
appears to commit one to a substantive metaphysical position, that is, to
rejecting nominalism (Salmon 1982, 43, 53; 2005, 133–34; Devitt 2005;
14. The later Kuhn associated the concept of incommensurability with the kind of
taxonomic reorganization and with the speciation of scientific fields that lead to the
violations of the no-overlap principle between the old and the new taxonomy. The
principle says that no two kind terms may overlap in their references, unless they are
related as species to genus. Further, interestingly, Kuhn thought that incommensura-
bility is a precondition, not an impediment, for scientific progress (e.g., 2000, 99).
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Laporte 2007; see also Macbeth 1995). This observation may offer us a
further explanation of Kuhn’s position on the matter (see sec. 7).
It is unlikely that Kuhn spent much time ruminating on rigidity, al-
though in one of his papers (1990) it appears even in the title. In this
paper, Kuhn suggests that scientific development involves interrelated acts
of redubbing sets of scientific terms. The reorganization of heavenly bodies
in the Copernican revolution could be a case in point. Kuhn goes on to
claim that between the acts of redubbing, dubbing results in rigid des-
ignation, a view positively commented on by Laporte (Kuhn 1990, 298;
Laporte 2000, 309). However, it is difficult to square the idea that general
terms designate their extensions with rigid designation. It is not clear how
we could preserve the set of individuals across all possible worlds, even
when the taxonomic system remains invariant. And Kuhn nowhere even
hints of the possibility of referring to abstract entities or universals.
5. Sameness Relation and Essentialism. Putnam suggested that rigid des-
ignation may be secured via a sameness relation between samples of the
kind. Salmon has usefully reconstructed Putnam’s theory of natural kind
terms. I reproduce part of it here (Salmon’s T3 and T5):
(T1). One may “explain the meaning” of a natural kind term such
as ‘water’ in an ostensive definition that has the intended logical force
as follows:
For every possible world w, and every individual x in w, x is water
in w if and only if x in w is the same liquid as this in the actual world
where the demonstrative ‘this’ rigidly denotes a sample of water in
the actual world.
(T2). Natural kind terms such as ‘water’ are rigid designators of
natural kinds, as a consequence of (T1). (Salmon 1982, 97)
The thesis T1 and Putnam’s philosophy offer one explanation why
natural kind terms would refer rigidly. All samples of a kind have to bear
a sameness relation to the actual sample baptized and referred to. The
crucial question is therefore what an appropriate sameness relation is.
What kind of sameness relation between samples would make them fall
under the kind water? There has to be something that guarantees mem-
bership in that category. Further, a failure to have it would disqualify a
sample from that category. Putnam refers here to “important physical
properties,” “microstructure,” “nature,” “hidden structure,” or most tell-
ingly “essence” (1975, 232–35). And, in the case of water, the obvious
candidate is the chemical structure of H2O. As Putnam puts it, “Once we
have discovered the nature of water, nothing counts as a possible world
in which water doesn’t have that nature. Once we have discovered that
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water (in the actual world) is H2O, nothing counts as a possible world in
which water isn’t H2O” (233).
The suggestion above is thus that water is H2O, and it is necessary for
a sample to be H2O in order to be water; H2O is the essence of water,
and in general, essence is something that a substance cannot fail to have
and still be that substance. Therefore, if water is H2O, it is necessarily so.
However, in order for this to work, we must be satisfied that we have
found an essence of substance. In other words, we need to prove the
theoretical identification statement ‘Water p H2O’. This is where Kuhn
enters the picture. Kuhn writes that if only one single essential property
is required by each natural kind, then the causal theory has promise
because we may be able to establish an identity relation between each
substance and its essential property. And in fact, Kuhn admits that if
‘gold’ can be “paired” with ‘having atomic number 79’ and ‘water’ with
‘being H2O’, then there is no problem (Kuhn 2000, 82). According to
Kuhn, the problem is that, in general, this strategy does not work.
Kuhn questions the theoretical identity statement ‘Water is H2O’. He
remarks that water is not identical with H2O, nor is the reference of ‘water’
H2O. Kuhn says that H2O can be in three states of aggregation: solid,
liquid, and gaseous. Consequently, ‘H2O’ picks out not only water but
also ice and steam. Therefore, the reference of ‘water’ cannot be equated
with that of ‘H2O’ because the latter covers a much wider domain than
we want (i.e., liquid, ice, and steam). According to Kuhn, a more proper
description would be that ‘water’ refers to liquid H2O or close-packed
H2O particles in relatively rapid motion.
Bird suggests that we may not need to claim as much as Kuhn implies.
Namely, we do not need to draw the conclusion from Putnam’s story that
water and H2O are identical, only that in all possible worlds water consists
of H2O (Bird 2000, 183). This sounds a promising way to go, as attempts
to prove that water is literally identical with H2O are hampered by great
difficulties (see Johnston 1997, 564–73). Similar to Bird’s, Johnston’s pre-
ferred understanding is that the identity statement should be taken as
saying that water is constituted by H2O, which can be used to explain its
manifest properties (582). It is indeed important to consider how the
alleged theoretical identification should be interpreted. Salmon suggested
that “is water” in T1 is not the ‘is’ of identity but the ‘is’ of predication
(1982, 99). How should we then read the statement ‘Water p H2O’? A
good suggestion is that it be interpreted as a conditional in the following
way: if x is water, then x is H2O. Further, it may be even better to use a
universal quantification: Gx (x is water o x is H2O), or in general, Gx
(Axo Bx). Alternatively, the sentence can be interpreted as a universally
quantified biconditional in a similar fashion (see Soames 2002, 250–59).
Putnam’s essentialism thus requires that, if a sample is water, it also is
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H2O. It is important to notice that, although Kuhn criticizes essentialism,
he does not seem to question this claim. This becomes apparent from
Kuhn’s disagreement with Putnam’s Twin Earth story. Kuhn cannot ac-
cept that visitors to Twin Earth would report back, “On Twin Earth, the
word ‘water’ means XYZ.” The reason is that modern chemistry does
not accept a substance like XYZ, which has the same superficial properties
as the stuff we call ‘water’ but nonetheless is a totally different chemical
structure from our water. For example, it would be too heavy to evaporate
at normal terrestrial temperatures. Therefore, the visitors would report,
“Back to the drawing board! Something is badly wrong with chemical
theory” (Kuhn 2000, 80). Quite clearly, Kuhn thinks that water has to
be H2O, although the reason for this belief does not derive from any kind
of metaphysical necessity but from the fact that the lexicon of modern
chemistry does not allow any other kind of description (cf. Read and
Sharrock 2002, 154).
Jackson writes that we resist saying that the waterlike stuff on Twin
Earth is water because it does not have an important property that we
associate with water. We have never come across waterlike stuff XYZ.
Just like Kuhn, he says that this shows that the chemical structure H2O
is one important property in the scientific lexicon that we associate with
‘water’. It is part of the description associated with ‘water’ used to de-
termine its extension. Further, similarly to Kuhn, Jackson says that if we
were acquainted with XYZ, this discovery would lead to a more or less
radical scientific readjustment but not to the refutation of the idea that
natural kinds objects are associated with and individuated by their as-
sumed properties (1998, 213).
However, essentialism does not only say that having the essential prop-
erty is necessary for something being a certain substance. It also says that
having it is sufficient for being that substance (cf. Soames 2002, 15). A
substance or an entity can lack any superficial property or stereotype that
is associated with a kind and still be the kind: a stripeless tiger is tiger,
if it has a certain genetic structure; a sample of stuff is water even if it is
pink, provided it is H2O, and so on. However, the very possibility of
finding such a sufficient essential property is what Kuhn questions. In
other words, Kuhn wonders whether it is sufficient for x to be water if x
is H2O.
Kuhn’s argument is that if something is to qualify as water, it needs to
have some further qualities, such as ‘liquidity’. That can be seen if you
consider the following situation. We may say that ‘water consists of or is
H2O’ but also that ‘steam consists of or is H2O’ and further that ‘ice
consists of or is H2O’. If this is all the information we have, we are left
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wondering what on earth the difference between these is.15 Why do we
have three terms instead of one? Therefore, it seems that, if x is H2O, it
is not yet enough for its being water because it could be steam or ice as
well. Bird correctly reminds us that the causal theory is a thesis about
words, not a metaphysical thesis about essences (2004b, 63). Indeed, ‘wa-
ter’, ‘steam’, and ‘ice’ are all ordinary words, and the differences in their
usage require an explanation, even if their references share an essence. Of
course, we can stretch the boundaries of language, but it seems rather
difficult to deny that the use of these terms is crucially related to a dis-
tinction between liquid, gaseous, and solid substances (cf. Johnston 1997;
Soames 2002, 294–96).
Interestingly, Putnam’s sameness relation, which decides whether two
or more samples are water, is specifically the same liquid relation (1975,
232). This implies that in addition to being H2O, the stuff has to have
another property in order to be water. It is not enough that the stuff is
H2O; it also has to be liquid, which is (surprisingly) a similar position to
that of Kuhn. Kuhn says that when two or more properties are needed,
such as liquidity and H2O, then each predicate denotes a larger class than
the conjunction does. Naming properties that limit the class becomes
crucial: “For if two properties are required, why not three or four? Are
we not back to the standard set of problems that causal theory was in-
tended to resolve: which properties are essential, which accidental; which
properties belong to a kind by definition, which are only contingent? Has
the transition to a developed scientific vocabulary really helped at all? I
think it has not” (Kuhn 2000, 82–83).
Kuhn claims that, except perhaps in rare circumstances, we need to
identify more than one property that an instance must possess in order
to be a member of the kind category. Kuhn thinks, as we have seen, that
categories are formed by recognizing similarities and dissimilarities be-
tween instances. Samples of ‘water’ may be thought to be both H2O and
liquid. Liquidity is needed to separate water, for instance, from steam and
ice. We need to make a difference by naming some properties that samples
in each category have and use in this task, such properties as liquid,
gaseous, and solid; perhaps also some other properties, such as boiling
and freezing points, optical wavelengths, and so on, can be used. Further,
it is not self-evident which ones to choose. Kuhn writes, “The so-called
superficial properties are no less necessary than their apparently essential
successors. To say that water is liquid H2O is to locate it within an elab-
orate lexical and theoretical system. . . . If water is liquid H2O, then these
15. Johnston has pointed out that the statement ‘water p H2O’ takes us easily to
absurd conclusions. If that statement is acceptable, then so is ‘ice p H2O’. But then
we should conclude that ‘water p ice’ (1997; cf. Soames 2002, chap. 11).
560 JOUNI-MATTI KUUKKANEN
properties are necessary to it. If they were not realized in practice that
would be a reason to doubt that water really was H2O” (2000, 83). In
other words, the so-called superficial properties have an indispensable role
to play in the prevailing lexical system, in separating instances of kinds
from each other and assigning expectations to substances.
6. Kuhn’s Descriptivism. It is obvious that Kuhn denies the validity of
the direct theory of reference as a general theory of reference.16 He suggests
that it may work with proper names, and even with some exceptional
natural kind terms, but notes that it does not work with scientific terms
in general. Although Kuhn does not require the application of description
in baptizing, because direct contact with the members of a natural kind
gives rise to a set of kind discriminating predicates, the similarity and
dissimilarity relations are subsequently used to determine and adjust ref-
erence. Underlying Kuhn’s critique of the causal theory is, hence, his own
suggestion that conceptual categories are formed by observing similarities
and dissimilarities between objects, which results in “natural families,”
that is, family resemblance concepts. This theory is something that Shar-
rock and Read seemed to be looking for in their allusion to “systemat-
icity,” the functioning of which is characterized by Andersen et al. with
the help of recent theories in cognitive science.
Because Kuhn’s theory specifies not only what properties a kind can
have but also what it cannot have, it is a rather peculiar sort of descrip-
tivism (cf. Bird 2000, 163–68). As we saw in section 3, the set of properties
that characterize a stereotypical member of a kind is not a definition of
the kind. This means that a description does not have to be fully satisfied
in order for a term to refer. The function of a description is to determine
to what category/kind a particular individual belongs. Therefore, the ob-
jection that description is synonymous with reference does not have a bite
against Kuhn’s theory. The essential claim is that reference is determined
by a certain mechanism, which is the possession (and exclusion) of as-
sociated properties up to a satisfactory degree (see Jackson 1998).
Kuhn’s account may deliver at least a partial answer to the so-called
objection from error, that is, the claim that people may have most of the
relevant properties wrong and yet still manage to refer to an object by a
term (see Jackson 1998). Because Kuhn’s set characterizes what a member
of the kind typically is and is not, it is indeed possible that one is wrong
about most of the associated properties. Something in the description has
to be satisfied, and moreover, there are properties that an entity cannot
16. The direct theory of reference says that terms refer directly to their references, not
via any form of description. The Putnam-Kripke causal theory of reference is a kind
of direct theory of reference.
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have, but it is less important which ones. The only requirement for this
theory is that it is successful in the categorizing of kinds so that their
boundaries are sharp. If the latter is achieved by an erroneous set of
properties, it does not matter. That Kuhn’s theory is able to limit kind
categories is shown by Andersen (2000). Kuhn’s reliance on dissimilarity
or the contrasting sets of others kinds, and not only to similarity, manages
to limit what falls in a kind category.
A further consequence of Kuhn’s descriptivism is that it does not matter
whether people associate different sets of properties with a term. Kuhn
explicitly denies that the sameness of description is a requirement for
successful reference. Homogenous categorizing of objects in a community
does not require that the criteria or “a set of learned expectations about
the similarities and differences between the objects” that picks out objects
in the world are the same. Only the taxonomic structure needs to be the
same (Kuhn 2000, 239, 242).
7. Concluding Remarks. I have attempted to show that Kuhn’s work has
many interesting connections with contemporary debates in analytic phi-
losophy, with direct relevance for philosophy of science. Kuhn took, im-
plicitly or explicitly, a stand on ostensive baptizing, the designation of
general terms, rigidity, and essentialism. Perhaps the most interesting of
these is his argument, contra Putnam, that the establishment of an essence
by way of theoretical identifications is not sufficient to determine the
extension of a kind. Also Kuhn’s theory of reference, in which extension
is determined by similarity and dissimilarity relations, is a notable contri-
bution.
The debates on Kuhn’s philosophy have triggered strong rhetorical
reactions from many commentators (see sec. 1). Some have argued (e.g.,
Hoyningen-Huene, Oberheim, and Andersen 1996; Hoyningen-Huene and
Oberheim 2009) that meta-incommensurability between the realist and the
nonrealist makes rational dialogue extremely difficult between the par-
ticipants on the different sides of the dispute. It is a valuable observation
that the debate is preconditioned by radically different metaphysical as-
sumptions and argumentative intentions, the settlement of which is not
easy through philosophical discourse. Yet I would hesitate to claim that
the disagreements derive from incommunicable differences in the meanings
of some basic terms. It strikes as being futile to insist that no rational
argument can have compelling force or that the arguments are necessarily
circular, as this position really becomes an “argument stopper” (Sankey
2009, 212). My view is that the undisputable tendency to argue within
and from one’s own framework does not make rational and fruitful phil-
osophical debate impossible. It only means that one needs to show height-
ened sensitivity and attention to the details from which the disagreements
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are expected to arise. Indeed, I hope to have demonstrated that even if
Kuhn’s arguments were tentative and in need of reconstruction, all the
themes mentioned above place him in a fruitful dialogue with contem-
porary philosophers in the analytic tradition.
Kuhn’s philosophy challenges the view according to which the history
of science converges on the true description of the real joints of nature.
According to Kuhn, the history of science comprises discontinuity in the
form of taxonomic reorganizations of kinds, and “there is no basis for
singling out one or the other juxtaposed set as the more real” (2000, 249).
In this article, I have explicated the philosophical grounding of this ar-
gument and shown that it can be reached on a principled basis. An in-
teresting further question is whether there is a more general framework
behind this line of reasoning. There are two or three fruitful suggestions
to explain Kuhn’s antiessentialism and commitment to individuals. Kuhn
can be taken as a metaphysical nominalist (Hacking 1993), an episte-
mological nominalist (Bird 2003), or a Kantian (Hoyningen-Huene 1993;
see also Andersen 2001b). Perhaps he presupposed that universals, in-
cluding essences, do not literally exist and cannot be taken to underlie
any actual or potential kind category. Or maybe he only assumed that
they are, in the world in itself, veiled from us, which forces us to study
and categorize observed similarities and dissimilarities in the phenomenal
world. This is a topic that cannot be taken further here but opens an
interesting theme for future research.
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